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The Legality of the Citizenship Deprivation of UK Foreign Terrorist 
Fighters 
 
Dr Paul Arnell 
 
Introduction  
 
The deprivation of citizenship in UK law and practice has come to the fore in recent 
years. Foreign terrorist fighters have been a notable target. The case of Shamima 
Begum is one of the latest examples.1 Less recently is the case of Hilal Al-Jedda.2 
The increased scale of deprivations and the profile of those affected have brought 
the subject into public consciousness. The numbers of persons who have lost their 
citizenship between 2006 and 2016 is 373, a marked increase on previous 
periods.3 The renown of certain affected individuals has led to their stories making 
the front pages, including those of Begum, Al-Jedda, and Abu Hamza.4 These 
cases raise a number of questions. Has there been a permanent change in 
perceptions of immigration and Britishness?5 Is deprivation an effective tool in the 
fight against terrorism?6 And, perhaps more technical but no less important, is UK 
law and practice in accordance with international law? This latter question is the 
focus of this article. It is important simply because the deprivation of citizenship 
has severe consequences for the individual concerned. Further, the issues raised 
have to-date not been internationally litigated.7 An answer to the question may 
provide the basis of a remedy for individuals affected by deprivation or indeed 
lead to a change in the law. It is argued that there are five grounds that can be 
put forward in opposition to UK law and practice. The first is jurisdictional. Here 
                                       
1 The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) decided several preliminary issues 
against Begum on 7 February 2020, in Begum v Secretary of State [2020] HRLR 7, cited 
at https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/begum-v-home-secretary-
siac-judgment.pdf. An appeal is pending. 
2 The Secretary of State lost her appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal 
quashing the order depriving Al-Jedda of his citizenship in Secretary of State v Al-Jedda 
[2013] UKSC 62. Hereinafter Al-Jedda. He was eventually deprived on new facts coming 
to light.  
3 Weil, P., and Handler, N., Revocation of Citizenship and Rule of Law: How Judicial Review 
defeated Britain’s First Denaturalization Regime, (2018) 36(2) Law and History Review 
295 at p 352. 
4 The attempt to deprive Hamza of his UK citizenship was ultimately unsuccessful. See Abu 
Hamza v SSHD [2010] SIAC 23/2003 (05 November 2010), cited at 
www.refworld.org/docid/4ce2a8022.html.  
5 See Mantu, S., Terrorist Citizens and the Human Right to Nationality (2018) 26 Journal 
of Contemporary European Studies 28 at p 32. 
6 See Zedner, L., Citizenship Deprivation, Security and Human Rights, (2016) 18 European 
Journal of Migration and Law 222 at p 240 et seq.  
7 In K2 v UK (No. 42387/13) 7 February 2017 the ECtHR did consider citizenship 
deprivation in an admissibility decision. It is mentioned below. A summary is cited at 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Citizenship_Deprivation_ENG.pdf.  
the UK’s claim that deprivation of an individual outside its territory will only 
exceptionally come within the jurisdiction of the ECHR appears questionable. 
Secondly, the rules prohibiting discrimination and arbitrariness in human rights 
law are arguably contravened by UK law and practice. Thirdly, the UK may be in 
breach of its obligations under the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
1961. Fourthly, the customary international law obligation upon the UK to readmit 
its citizens appears set to be violated in certain deprivation cases. Fifthly and 
finally, UK deprivation practice may violate its treaty obligations to extradite or 
prosecute individuals in certain cases. This article analyses UK citizenship 
deprivation law and practice as applied to foreign terrorist fighters under public 
international law.8 It concludes that there are arguments of considerable strength 
that can be made in opposition to it.  
 
Citizenship 
 
In order to fully appreciate the deprivation of citizenship9 in the UK the nature and 
origins of citizenship, the effects of deprivation and the development of UK law in 
the area require introduction. The subject of citizenship within the UK, and more 
generally, is vast and complex.10 It has both international and national 
dimensions.11 It is at once existential to statehood and fluid and disposable. As to 
the former, the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933 
provides that a criterion of statehood is a permanent population, implying 
citizenship.12 In contrast, as we will see, the UK (and many other states) 
unilaterally deprives persons of that status. It also allows the acquisition of 
citizenship, inter alia through naturalisation. The International Court of Justice has 
defined nationality as a legal bond which has as its basis “… a social fact of 
                                       
8 Goodwin-Gill, G.S., discussed the legality of the power under the then Immigration Bill 
2014 to deprive citizenship leading to statelessness in three submissions to Joint Select 
Committee on Human Rights in 2014 titled Mr Al-Jedda, Deprivation of Citizenship and 
International Law, Deprivation of Citizenship Resulting in Statelessness and its 
Implications in International Law, and Deprivation of Citizenship, Statelessness, and 
International Law More Authority, all found at 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-
rights-committee/legislative-scrutiny-2013-14/immigration-bill/. Hereinafter Goodwin-Gill 
Al-Jedda, Deprivation, and More Authority respectively.  
9 As to terminology, the law governing the area, the British Nationality Act 1981, refers to 
the deprivation of ‘citizenship’. It will be used. The ‘deprivation of citizenship’ will 
henceforth be referred to simply as ‘deprivation’.  
10 Amongst a voluminous literature see Fransman, L., British Nationality Law: Immigration 
and Nationality Law, Third Edition, Bloomsbury Professional, London 2011.  
11 It also has, of course, an EU dimension. Generally, however, EU law provides that the 
loss and acquisition of citizenship is a matter for national law. The European Council’s 
Edinburgh Decision provides that whether an individual possesses the nationality of a 
Member State will be settled solely by its national law, [1992] OJ C 348/1. See also 
Rottmann, Case C-135/08 [2010] ECR I-1449. 
12 In article 1, cited at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp.  
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments”.13 
Within the UK the origins of the concept are found in the notion of subjecthood. It 
was over the 14th-19th centuries that British subject status “… emerged as the 
gateway to formal community membership”.14 This necessarily included the 
origins of the distinction between British subjects and aliens, with the former 
holding various privileges denied the latter. Emerging as a defining characteristic 
of subjecthood was allegiance. In 1608 in Calvin’s Case Lord Coke likened it to “…  
the ligatures or strings [that] knit together the joints of all the parts of the body, 
so doth ligeance join together the Sovereign and all his subjects”.15 The 
relationship between the state and the subject was reciprocal – with the subject 
owing allegiance and the state owing a duty of protection. Coke termed this a 
“mutual bond and obligation between the King and his subjects”.16 A binary 
conception of subjects or citizens on the one hand and aliens on the other does 
not reflect modern practice. Today there are a variety of relationships between 
the state and persons connected to it. This is germane because deprivation can 
turn on the type of citizenship one has. Similarly, whether an individual is capable 
of acquiring a second citizenship is also relevant. Modern day deprivation and 
indeed acquisition of citizenship reflects a commodification and transience of the 
relationship far removed from its origins. Coke described allegiance as being “… 
indefinite, and without limit, ‘from this day forward’”.17 This is anachronistic. The 
UK today is increasingly seeking to disburden itself of perceived troublesome 
citizens by way of deprivation. In contrast, international law acts to protect and 
govern citizenship and citizens in a number of respects. The resultant conflict is 
the focus of this examination. 
 
The Deprivation of Citizenship 
 
The deprivation of citizenship entails the withdrawal of that status from an 
individual.18 In UK law it occurs in different circumstances and for different 
reasons. As to circumstances, the power can be applied to naturalised citizens 
                                       
13 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), (1955) ICJ Rep. 4, 6 April 1955, at p 23. 
14 Pillai, S., and Williams, G., Twenty-first Century Banishment: Citizenship Stripping in 
Common Law Nations, (2017) 66(3) ICLQ 521 at p 523. 
15 (1608) 77 Eng Rep 377, at p 382.  The case concerned the allegiance of a Scot to the 
King following the Union of the Crowns in 1603.  
16 Ibid at p 382. 
17 Ibid at p 385, citing an oath of allegiance. 
18 The UK is by no means the only European state to deprive citizenship. The former official 
reviewer of terrorism law in the UK, David Anderson, has noted that research indicated 
that 14 of 33 European states studied provided for deprivation for actions contrary to the 
interests of the state, in Anderson, D., Citizenship Removal Resulting in Statelessness, 
First Report of Independent Reviewer on the Operation of the Power to Remove Citizenship 
Obtained by Naturalisation from Persons who have no Other Citizenship, April 2016, at 
para 3.3, cited at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/citizenship-removal-
resulting-in-statelessness.  
alone, naturalised and registered citizens, or British born, naturalised and 
registered citizens. It can also be applied to certain sole UK citizens and those with 
two or more citizenships. Deprivation can be applied to persons within and outside 
the UK. It can take place in conjunction with deportation or on its own. The 
grounds upon which a deprivation can be made also vary considerably. Fraud, a 
criminal conviction and trading with the enemy have been long standing grounds. 
We are only concerned presently with the deprivation of foreign terrorist fighters. 
The basis in these cases generally is that it is conducive to the public good. In all 
cases, though, deprivation is life changing. Removed are a number of vital benefits 
arising from belonging to the UK.19 The SIAC has stated “Citizenship is the 
fundamental civic right. It is not necessary to go as far as Warren CJ in Trop v. 
Dulles 356 U.S. 86 in evaluating the importance of its loss as ‘the total destruction 
of the individual status in organised society’; but on any view, its loss, for the 
citizen, is a very serious detriment”.20 The effect of deprivation has been said to 
be the:  
“… loss of the right of abode… is the main consequence… The affected subject 
also suffers the loss of associated and consequential rights, duties, duties and 
opportunities – in particular voting, standing for election, jury service, 
military service, eligibility for appointment to the Civil Service and access to 
state benefits, state financed healthcare and state sponsored education. 
Fundamentally, the relationship between the individual and the State, which 
lies at the heart of citizenship and nationality, is extinguished”.21 
 
Relevant UK Law 
 
Governing deprivation in the UK is section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 
(BNA 1981). When enacted section 40(3) provided for deprivation on the grounds 
of disloyalty or disaffection towards Her Majesty, unlawful trading or 
communication with an enemy in war or being sentenced to imprisonment in any 
country to a term not less than one year. Notably, the British Nationality Act (No. 
2) 1964 had previously limited the power to deprive in cases where an individual 
had been convicted of an offence where it appeared to the Secretary of State that 
that person would become stateless. This amendment was made so that the UK 
comply with the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 1961, discussed 
further below. In contrast to this restriction the BNA 1981 extended the power to 
deprive to cover those who had become citizens by registration, i.e. citizens of 
                                       
19 Gibney notes that “The loss of citizenship transforms the citizen into an alien in the eyes 
of the state, stripping them of all rights held qua citizen and making them vulnerable to 
deportation power. An individual might even be rendered stateless”, in Gibney, M., ‘A Very 
Transcendental Power’: Denaturalisation and the Liberalisation of Citizenship in the United 
Kingdom, (2013) 61 Political Studies 637 at p 638.  
20 Al-Jedda v Secretary of State, SC/66/2008, 7 April 2009 cited at 
http://siac.decisions.tribunals.gov.uk/Documents/outcomes/Al_Jedda_SubstantiveOpenJ
udgment_07Apr09.pdf at para 4.  
21 Ahmed and others (deprivation of citizenship) [2017] UKUT 00118 (IAC) at para 27. 
former colonies who acquired citizenship following residence in the UK. This 
extension did not signal an increase in the exercise of the power. Indeed “… by 
the end of the 20th century, deprivation power in the UK appeared to be moribund. 
By 2002, not a single individual had lost his or her citizenship (other than under 
fraud provisions) for thirty years”.22 
 
A notable development related to the legality of UK deprivation was the enactment 
of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The 2002 Act provided that 
the ‘natural-born’, and not just the naturalised and registered, could lose their 
citizenship. The applicable test was also changed. The Secretary of State now had 
to be satisfied that the individual acted in a way that was “seriously prejudicial to 
the vital interests” of the UK. From a procedural perspective, the 2002 Act 
replaced the system of deprivation committee review of decisions with the 
possibility of an appeal to a tribunal or SIAC.23 Finally, and most importantly from 
a legality perspective, the 2002 Act provided that a deprivation could not take 
place if it would make an individual stateless in all cases except fraud, false 
representation or concealment of a material fact. Together these changes have 
been described as an “odd combination of expansion and contraction… explained 
by the government’s desire to stay on the right side of the European Convention 
on Nationality”.24 In 2006 the law was further amended, with the ‘conducive to 
the public good’ test returning in place of ‘prejudicial to vital interests’, purportedly 
because the latter threshold was considered too high.25 The 2006 Act did not alter 
the statelessness limitation, with section 40(4) of the BNA 1981 continuing to 
provide that the Secretary of State could not make a deprivation order if she was 
satisfied that that the order would make a person stateless. What did change 
following the 2006 Act was the emergence of an enhanced political desire to 
exercise the existing power, and with that a degree of frustration at the limits of 
the law as it then stood.  
 
The legislative response to the perceived limitations in the power to deprive 
following the amendments in 2002 and 2006 was the Immigration Act 2014. 
Reintroduced into UK law was the power to deprive where it results in 
statelessness. This change can be traced, at least in part, to the Government’s 
failed appeal to the Supreme Court in the case of Al-Jedda.26 The 2014 Act inserted 
section 40(4A) into the BNA 1981. It provides that the obligation not to make an 
                                       
22 Gibney, M., The Deprivation of Citizenship in the United Kingdom: A Brief History, (2014) 
28(4) Immigration, Nationality and Asylum Law 326 at p 330. Hereinafter A Brief History.  
23 As to the committee see Weil and Handler, supra note 4. 
24 Gibney, A Brief History, supra note 22 at p 332. The powers under the 2002 Act were 
exercised only once, ultimately unsuccessfully, as regards Abu Hamza. The UK has not 
ratified the European Convention on Nationality 1997.  
25 Goodwin-Gill, Al-Jedda, supra note 8 at p 6, citing Baroness Ashton in the House of 
Lords, H.L. Deb, 14 March 2006, col 1190. The change was affected by the Immigration, 
Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 section 56.  
26 Supra note 2. 
individual stateless does not prevent deprivation of a naturalised citizen where it 
is conducive to the public good because the individual conducted himself in a 
manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK. This is limited to 
circumstances where the Secretary of State has “… reasonable grounds for 
believing that the person is able, under the law of a country or territory outside 
the United Kingdom, to become a national of such a country or territory”.27 
Accordingly, the position as regards statelessness reverted to that existing prior 
to 2002.28 The amendment was controversial. Its passage generated “… the most 
lively and extended parliamentary discussion of denaturalisation powers since the 
1918 Act”.29 The debates where rightly contested, section 40(4A) forms the basis 
of two of the five arguments that UK deprivation law and practice may be contrary 
to international law.30 Overall, then, there are two provisions which can be invoked 
to deprive a foreign terrorist fighter of UK citizenship; section 40(2) under which 
a conducive to the public good test must be met and the power is restricted to 
cases where the individual will not be made stateless and section 40(4A) as just 
described. 
 
Analysis – Legality 
 
International law does not prohibit the deprivation of citizenship. There is not a 
justiciable right to a citizenship, nor a general prohibition on citizenship 
deprivation even where it leads to statelessness.31 Accordingly, arguments that 
UK law and practice in the area is unlawful must relate to considerations in one 
sense or other tangential to deprivation itself. There are five such features that 
arguably fall foul of international law. 
 
Applicability of the ECHR over UK Extraterritorial Deprivation  
 
                                       
27 This limitation was included late in the legislative process following opposition in the 
House of Lords to the Bill. Also included was a requirement for the periodic review of the 
power, under s 40B. The first review was published in April 2016 by David Anderson, supra 
note 17. For a description of the passage of the Immigration Act 2014 see Harvey, A., 
Recent Developments on Deprivation of Nationality on Grounds of National Security and 
Terrorism Resulting in Statelessness, (2014) 28(4) Journal of Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Law 336.  
28 That power, however, had not been exercised after 1973, see Anderson, supra note 18 
at para 2.22. 
29 Gibney, A Brief History, supra note 22 at p 334. The British National and Status of Aliens 
Act 1918 widened the grounds upon which deprivation could take place. The power itself 
was introduced into UK law for the first time in 1914. 
30 This is because two of the five concern the reintroduction of the power to make an 
individual stateless and that power’s purported effects. The other three do not. 
31 This is perhaps surprising and not uncontroversial. See, for example, Zedner, supra note 
6, and Foster, M. and Lambert, H., Statelessness as a Human Rights Issue - A Concept 
Whose Time Has Come, (2016) 28 International Journal of Refugee Law 564.  
A first rule arguably infringed by UK deprivation law and practice is jurisdictional. 
This argument concerns the scope of human rights protection under the ECHR, 
and in particular the view of the UK Government that it only applies in limited and 
exceptional extraterritorial circumstances. Prior to considering the ambit of the 
ECHR it is necessary to note the application of Convention rights to deprivation 
generally. This is because if no rights are engaged then, of course, its jurisdictional 
ambit is moot. As mentioned, there is not a free-standing right to citizenship under 
the ECHR, or indeed any other binding international instrument.32 The UK is not 
obliged to protect citizenship as a matter of international law. That noted, certain 
rights may be engaged by deprivation. The Joint Committee has stated: 
“… deprivation of citizenship has such serious consequences for the individual 
concerned that it indirectly engages a number of other human rights. It may, 
for example, [make one] liable to be removed or excluded from the UK, which 
engages, for example, the right to be free of degrading treatment (Article 3 
ECHR), the right to liberty (Article 5 ECHR), the right to respect for family life 
(Article 8 ECHR), and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of the right to 
enter one’s own country (Article 12(4) ICCPR)”.33  
The ECtHR affirmed the application of the Convention to citizenship in Genovese 
v Malta.34 
 
With certain rights under the ECHR applying to deprivation cases the question 
arises of whether the situs of the individual at the time of the decision is relevant. 
The UK Home Office’s Supplementary Memorandum titled the Deprivation of 
Citizenship: Conduct Seriously Prejudicial to the Vital Interests of the United 
Kingdom inter alia provides “… decisions as to citizenship are capable of engaging 
Article 8”.35 This protection, however, is limited. The Memorandum continues “… 
where an individual is not in the UK’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the ECHR, 
that person’s Article 8 rights will not be engaged by a deprivation decision”.36 This 
unequivocal statement was explained by James Brokenshire MP, the then Minister 
of Immigration and Security, in a letter to the Joint Committee. He wrote “… a 
                                       
32 Article 15 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, in contrast, provides that 
everyone has the right to nationality, and that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived it, see 
Adjami, M., and Harrington, J., The Scope and Content of Article 15 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, (2008) 27(3) Refugee Survey Quarterly 93. 
33 Human Rights Joint Committee, Twelfth Report, Legislative Scrutiny: Immigration Bill 
(Second Report), February 2014, at para 159, footnotes omitted, at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201314/jtselect/jtrights/142/14202.htm. 
Hereinafter the Joint Committee, Twelfth Report. 
34 (2014) 58 EHHR 25. It was held in the case that it cannot be ruled out that “… an 
arbitrary denial of citizenship might in certain cases raise an issue under article 8”, at para 
30. Arbitrariness is discussed below. 
35 January 2014, cited at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachme
nt_data/file/276660/Deprivation_ECHR_memo.pdf, at paras 9-10. 
36 Ibid at para 13. 
person’s Article 8 rights may be in exceptional circumstances engaged by a 
deprivation decision when that person is not physically present in the UK”.37 Those 
circumstances are not stated. The letter merely iterates the view that the 
Convention does not routinely have extraterritorial effect and refers to a leading 
jurisdiction case, Al-Skeini v UK.38 Acting upon this restrictive understanding of 
the ECHR’s applicability the UK Government has adopted a policy whereby the 
facts of an extraterritorial deprivation are examined to consider “what, if any, risk 
of mistreatment an individual may face as a consequence of deprivation action”.39  
 
The UK Government’s position on the exceptional applicability of the ECHR to 
extraterritorial deprivations has been refuted by the Joint Committee40 and 
academic commentators.41 There are, it is submitted, two somewhat related 
arguments that can be put forward in opposition. The first is that the Convention 
does apply to extraterritorial deprivations on the basis of ECtHR jurisprudence, 
albeit not on the basis of Al-Skeini v UK. That case was correctly proffered as 
authority for the exceptional extraterritorial application of the Convention. As is 
well known, it forms part of a complex body of jurisprudence extending Convention 
‘jurisdiction’ to certain extraterritorial circumstances. These come under the 
‘effective control’ and ‘state agent authority’ principles.42 Neither of which are of 
particular relevance to extraterritorial deprivation. In such cases the UK would not 
effective control over the area where an individual is present, nor would its state 
agents have used force outside UK territory or taken her into custody. Rather, it 
is the rule that has developed in response to expulsions cases, starting with 
Soering v UK43, that arguably applies. Here the responsibility of a state party may 
be engaged where an intra-territorial decision is taken in circumstances where it 
is aware of the real risk of a possible future extraterritorial violation. The expulsion 
jurisprudence accords with extraterritorial deprivations in this respect - with the 
admittedly not-insignificant difference that the individual is outside of the territory 
                                       
37 Cited at https://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-
rights/Letter_from_James_Brokenshire_MP_200214.pdf, at page 3. 
38 (2011) 53 EHRR 18.  
39 Brokenshire, supra note 37 at p 3. The Joint Committee, Twelfth Report refers to this 
policy as a ‘practice’ not considered a ‘legal requirement’ by the Secretary of State, supra 
note 33 at para 41. In Begum SIAC considered the issue in line with the Government’s 
view and assessed the case in light of the policy, see Begum, supra note 1. Notably, 
however, it also found that the conditions in the Al Roj camp would breach article 3 if it 
had applied to her case, at para 129.  
40 Joint Committee, Twelfth Report, supra note 33 at para 45.  
41 Goodwin-Gill, Deprivation, supra note 8 at paras 25-28, and Zedner, supra note 6 at p 
238-240.  
42 There is a wealth of writing on this, including Milanovic, M., Extraterritorial Application 
of Human Rights Treaties, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011 and Arnell, P., Law Across 
Borders: The Extraterritorial Application of UK Law, Routledge, London, 2012, chapter 4. 
43 (1989) 11 EHRR 439.  
of the UK at the time of the decision.44 That decision, however, can undoubtedly 
contribute to, or lead to, an infringement of the individual’s rights. Those persons, 
former citizens, undoubtedly have a strong link with the UK. The argument that 
the Convention applies to certain extraterritorial deprivation decisions, particularly 
of sole nationals being made stateless and facing a real risk of their human rights 
being infringed appears tenable.45  
 
The status of the individual affected is at the heart of a second argument that can 
be made in opposition to the UK’s view of extraterritorial deprivation. Goodwin-
Gill has written: 
“It is certainly wishful legal thinking to suppose that a person’s ECHR rights 
can be annihilated simply by depriving that person of citizenship while he or 
she is abroad. Even a little logic suffices to show that the act of deprivation 
only has meaning if it is directed at someone who is within the jurisdiction of 
the State. A citizen is manifestly someone subject to and within the 
jurisdiction of the State, and the purported act of deprivation is intended 
precisely to affect his or her rights. 46 
The Joint Committee agreed, stating “In our view, a deprivation decision must be 
compatible with those Articles whether the citizen concerned is abroad or in the 
UK at the time of the deprivation decision”.47 ‘Jurisdiction’ in the sense used here 
by Goodwin-Gill differs from that commonly conceived in analyses of the ambit of 
ECHR protections. As noted, the latter generally equates to extraterritorial 
effective control or state agent authority, whilst the former centres upon the 
relationship between the individual and the state party. Integral to that 
relationship is the lawful power of a state to control and affect its citizens, perhaps 
most relevantly in this context by way of extending its criminal law to crimes 
committed anywhere on that basis alone.48 In this sense citizens remain within 
the jurisdiction of the state of their nationality regardless of their situs. It is 
arguable that this rationale, either alone or in conjunction with that underlying 
Soering v UK, forms a basis upon which opposition to the UK’s position can be 
                                       
44 The Grand Chamber admissibility decision of MN v Belgium, App. no. 3599/18, 5 March 
2020, is arguably equivocal on this point. On the one hand it rules out an analogy with 
Soering v UK where the applicants are outside the territory of the state party (at para 
120), yet it confirms jurisdiction is a question of fact turning on the nature of the link 
between the applicants and the state in order to ascertain whether it effectively exercised 
authority or control over them (para 113), cited at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
202468. In an extraterritorial deprivation the UK undoubtedly exercises authority over the 
individual in putatively removing their citizenship. 
45 In K2 v UK, supra note 7, the ECtHR declared an application manifestly unfounded where 
a naturalised British citizen holding Sudanese citizenship was deprived for nationality 
security considerations. Amongst the reasons was his dual nationality.  
46 Goodwin-Gill, Al-Jedda, supra note 8 at p 13. Emphasis in original.  
47 Joint Committee, Twelfth Report, supra note 33 at p 4. 
48 See Arnell, P., The Case for Nationality Based Jurisdiction, (2001) 50 ICLQ 955. 
founded.49 This might be thought of as ‘functional jurisdiction’, arising through the 
“… exercise of public powers, such as those ordinarily assumed by a territorial 
sovereign, taking the form of policy delivery and/or operational action translating 
into ‘situational control”’.50 Admittedly, the arguments put forward here are moot, 
and indeed conflict with certain dicta, but there are, it is submitted cogent 
considerations in their favour. 
 
Discrimination and Arbitrariness   
Discrimination and arbitrariness form the basis of further arguments that can be 
put forward in opposition to UK deprivation law and practice. These grounds are 
linked in part to the jurisdictional point in that they are attendant to the 
substantive rights under the Convention. Article 14 of the ECHR prohibits 
discrimination in the application of human rights on the basis of, inter alia, national 
or social origin, birth or other status. This is germane in the deprivation context 
because UK law differentiates between persons on the basis of national origin, 
birth and the number of nationalities one has. Simply, naturalised and dual 
national citizens are treated differently than British-born sole nationals. The 
former are subject to possible deprivation in circumstances the latter are not. In 
other words, the manner of acquisition of one’s citizenship and the possession of 
more than one are conditions precedent for deprivation not, say, the risk an 
individual poses to national security.51 This position gave rise to disquiet during 
the passage of the 2014 Act. Jacob Rees-Mogg MP, for example, stated “Once any 
one of us has a passport that says we are British, we are as British as anybody 
else, whether they were born here or got their passport five minutes ago. It is 
incredibly important that there is equality before the law for all Her Majesty’s 
subjects who are living in this country…”.52 As regards dual nationals, a review of 
section 40A of BNA 1981 stated that deprivation of naturalised citizens leads to 
                                       
49 In contrast, in S1, T1, U1 and V1 v Secretary of State an argument that an 
extraterritorial deprivation was an exercise of personal jurisdiction was rejected by SIAC. 
The rationale being that it was not within the power of the UK to uphold the applicant’s 
right not to be subjected to torture in Pakistan, Appeal No’s: SC/106/107/108/109/2012, 
21 Dec. 2012, cited at http://siac.decisions.tribunals.gov.uk/Documents/S1-T1-U1-V1-
open-judgment-21-12-12..pdf at para 28. Further, at the point of deprivation there was 
no threat to the applicants, ibid at para 29. 
50 See Moreno-Lax, V., The Architecture of Functional Jurisdiction: Unpacking Contactless 
Control – On Public Powers, S.S. and Others v. Italy, and the “Operational Model”, (2020) 
21 German Law Journal 385 at p 387. 
51 The distinction is ‘random’, says Yeo, with the proviso that black and ethnic minority 
children being more likely to be eligible for citizenship deprivation than others, Yeo, C., 
Some Citizens are More Equal than Others, 2019, Counsel, 24, cited at 
https://www.counselmagazine.co.uk/articles/some-citizens-are-more-equal-than-others. 
52 House of Commons Hansard, 30 January 2014, Vol. 574, col. 1086, at 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2014-01-
30/debates/14013058000001/ImmigrationBill?highlight=once%20one%20us%20passpo
rt%20that%20says%20british#contribution-14013061000019.  
those who have immigrated to the UK and retained their citizenship of origin not 
having the same security within the country as those who have always been 
citizens.53 More dramatically, it has been written that “… it is indefensible to 
discriminate against [naturalised citizens] in this way”.54 The UK Government has 
said in response to this argument that there was an “… objective and reasonable 
justification for treating naturalised citizens differently than others”.55 This was 
that, it argued, naturalised citizens have chosen British values and been 
naturalised on the basis of their good character.56 ECtHR jurisprudence provides 
that a difference in treatment will be discriminatory where it does not have 
objective and reasonable justification, which means that it does not pursue a 
legitimate aim or that there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.57 It appears 
arguable that, due to the severe consequences of deprivation and the seemingly 
remoteness between it and meaningful action against the threat of terrorism, the 
UK’s justification for the discriminatory treatment would fall foul of article 14.58 
The prohibition of arbitrariness is a second human rights-related basis that can be 
put forward in opposition to UK law and practice.59 As noted, the ECtHR has held 
that arbitrary deprivation decisions might raise an issue under article 8.60 The UN’s 
Human Rights Council has provided that the arbitrary deprivation of nationality, 
especially on discriminatory grounds, is a violation of human rights.61 This 
argument was made by the Joint Committee in 2005 as regards the amendments 
to the deprivation power in the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill. It noted 
“… insufficient guarantees against arbitrariness in its exercise in light of (i) the 
significant reduction in the threshold, (ii) the lack of requirement of objectively 
reasonable grounds for the Secretary of State’s belief, and (iii) the arbitrariness 
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54 Zedner, supra note 6 at p 239. 
55 As noted in the Joint Committee, Twelfth Report, supra note 33 at para 50.  
56 Zedner notes that this view appears to rest on a “quasi-contractarian notion that 
naturalisation depends on a contractual agreement between state and foreigner” whereby 
the individual promises to abide by the law, supra note 6 at p 238. 
57 See Abdulaziz v UK (1985) 7 EHRR 471, and generally the Council of Europe’s Guide on 
Article 14, 1st Edition, Dec. 2019, at 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_14_Art_1_Protocol_12_ENG.pdf.  
58 In K2 v UK, supra note 7, the discrimination point does not appear to have been 
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59 Interestingly, deprivation was accepted as legitimate by philosophers including Kant, 
Constant and Beccaria as long as it was not arbitrarily applied, see Gibney, supra note 19 
at p 641. 
60 Genovese v Malta, supra note 34. Admittedly, this case concerned the denial of 
citizenship, rather than its deprivation.  
61 Resolution Adopted by the Human Rights Council 30 June 2016 on Human Rights and 
Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, cited at 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/57e3dc204.html.  
of the definition of the class affected…”.62 These criticisms subsist today. As seen, 
there is no judicial involvement in the deprivation decision making process. This 
contrasts with other terrorism-related measures such as Temporary Exclusion 
Orders. Additionally, concerns have been expressed about aspects of the appellate 
procedures at the SIAC as well as the fact that affected persons are not permitted 
to return to the UK to appeal deprivation.63 As to the review of decisions it is 
notable that in 2002 the system of Deprivation Committee review was abolished 
and replaced by an appellate system, including to the SIAC where nationality 
security concerns etcetera are accepted by the Secretary of State as being 
involved.64 The UK Government’s position as to arbitrariness and the present law 
was iterated by Theresa May in a debate leading to the 2014 Act. She said affected 
individuals “… will continue to be afforded an independent right of appeal, retaining 
an avenue of judicial redress. This is not about arbitrarily depriving people of their 
citizenship; it is a targeted policy that will be used sparingly against very 
dangerous individuals who have brought such action upon themselves through 
terrorist-related acts. [The new clause]… is a proportionate and necessary 
measure”.65 Notably, in response to a query from the Joint Committee the 
Government stated that it would adopt the approach advocated by the UNHCR in 
its 2010 Report Preventing and Reducing Statelessness. This included considering 
the proportionality of the measure taking in the full circumstances of the case.66 
In spite of this concession, in light of the effect of deprivation in the particular 
circumstances of cases such as Begum’s it appears arguable that it is not an 
objectively proportionate move in all cases.  
 
Violation of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 1961 
 
The terms the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 1961 form the basis 
of a third argument in opposition to UK deprivation law and practice. This 
argument relates to section 40A of the 1981 Act, the provision that may lead to 
statelessness. Entering into force in 1975, the 1961 Convention obliges state 
parties to avoid causing statelessness. Article 8(1) provides “A Contracting State 
                                       
62 Joint Committee, Third Report, Session 2004-05, 28 Nov. 2005, at para 164, at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200506/jtselect/jtrights/75/7507.htm.  
63 SIAC is discussed by the Joint Committee, Twelfth Report, supra note 33 at paras 72-
77. In regard to appealing whilst abroad, in Begum v Secretary of State SIAC agreed that 
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to stay her appeal, at para 191.  
64 Weil describes the positive effect of the Deprivation Committee procedure in mitigating 
the excesses of the power, supra note 3 at p 352.  
65 House of Commons Hansard, 30 Jan. 2014, at col 1050, cited at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm140130/debtext/140130-
0002.htm. 
66 Joint Committee, Twelfth Report, supra note 33 at para 61. 
shall not deprive a person of his nationality if such deprivation would render him 
stateless”. Article 8 also iterates exceptions to this rule. Of these, article 8(3) is 
especially relevant. It contains a condition that permits state parties to retain their 
right to engender statelessness. This is where a person conducted himself in a 
manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of that state. The UK exercised 
this right upon becoming a party, declaring: 
‘... the United Kingdom retains the right to deprive a naturalised person of 
his nationality on the following grounds, [they] being grounds existing in 
United Kingdom law at the present time: that… the person… (ii) Has 
conducted himself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of 
Her Britannic Majesty”.67 
This accorded with the terms of the 1961 Convention. UK law then contained that 
ground of deprivation. It is the subsequent evolution of UK law that can be argued 
gave rise to a contravention of the treaty. Particularly, this was the introduction 
of the prohibition of deprivation leading to statelessness under the 2002 Act and 
then the withdrawal of that ban by the 2014 Act. The issue that arises in these 
circumstances is the meaning of the phrase a “… State may retain the right to 
deprive a person of his nationality, if at the time… it specifies its retention”.68 
Specifically, does the right to retain the ability to make an individual stateless 
exist ad infinitum or, rather, can it be extinguished or waived through subsequent 
action by a state party.  
 
There are conflicting views on whether the UK permanently waived its right to 
render a person stateless in 2002. Fripp suggests it did:  
“The new provision might reasonably appear to breach the obligations of the 
UK under Article 8(3) CRS, because while this allowed a state to ‘retain’ the 
power to deprive an individual of nationality, the conception of ‘retention’ of 
a particular power, interpreted according to established principles, does not 
self-evidently coincide with ‘regaining’ or ‘recreating’ the power after it has 
been removed by the amendment of domestic law”.69 
Bucken and de Groot agree, and note that “… there are multiple legal arguments 
to make a strong case that the reintroduction of a ground on the basis of Article 
8(3) violates international law in general and the obligations of the United 
Kingdom under the 1961 Convention in particular”.70 The then Home Secretary 
Theresa May, on the other hand, said in the debate over the new power that the 
proposal was completely consistent with the Convention, “We put a declaration 
into the original UK convention, and we are taking the position back to what it was 
                                       
67 Cited in Goodwin-Gill, Al-Jedda, supra note 8 at p 4.  
68 Emphasis added.  
69 Fripp, E., The Law and Practice of Expulsion and Exclusion from the United Kingdom: 
Deportation, Removal, Exclusion and Deprivation of Citizenship, 1st Edition, Hart 
Publishing, 2015 at p 410.  
70 Bucken, L., and de Groot, R., Deprivation of Nationality under Article 8(3) of the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, (2018) 25(1) Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 38 at p 49. 
set out in that declaration”.71 Illuminating this difference of opinion is a change in 
the description of the reintroduced power in the Explanatory Notes accompanying 
the 2014 Bill and Act. Prior to its enactment it is described as “… intended to be 
consistent” with the 1961 Convention.72 After becoming law the Explanatory Notes 
had been changed to read that it “… is intended to be more closely aligned” with 
the treaty.73 Clearly, the authors of the Explanatory Notes had reservations 
whether the section complied with the 1961 Convention.  
 
The legality of the UK’s reintroduction of the power to make persons stateless 
centres upon the meaning of ‘retain’ in article 8(3). The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties 1969 is of some relevance here.74 Article 31(1) provides that a 
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose. The meaning of ‘retain’, according to the Cambridge Dictionary, is 
“to keep or continue to have something”. As to the context, object and purpose of 
the Convention it is axiomatic in that the instrument seeks to reduce 
statelessness. Its pithy preamble includes the statement that the state parties 
considered “it desirable to reduce statelessness by international agreement”. On 
the other hand, the 1969 Convention generally requires the withdrawal of 
reservations to be made in writing.75 There is also no set limit in time on article 
8(3) within the Convention, a state’s declaration may operate indefinitely. 
Accordingly, there are arguments for and against the legality of the UK’s position. 
The view that the reintroduction of the power to make an individual stateless in 
2014 was unlawful is therefore, at the very least, tenable.76 
 
Violation of Obligation to (Re)admit (Deprived) Citizens 
 
The obligation to readmit citizens is a fourth rule of international law arguably 
infringed by UK deprivation law and practice. This applies to the exercise of the 
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72 At para 382, cited at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2013-
2014/0084/en/14084en.htm.  
73 At paragraph 406, cited at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/22/notes.  
74 Although the Convention does not have retrospective effect, by article 4, it codified the 
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251 at p 282 per Lord Diplock. 
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76 The Open Society Justice Initiative’s Opinion on Clause 60 of the Immigration Bill and 
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section 40A power alone, in that it is the provision that can lead to an individual 
being made stateless. This illegality may arise where the UK deprives an individual 
of citizenship where she does not, or may not, hold the nationality of a third state, 
and then deports and refuses to readmit her. Equally it may occur where the UK 
deprives a citizen of their nationality whilst abroad in such circumstances and 
refuses to readmit him. The law as to the admission of citizens is clear. In R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Thakrar, Lord Denning 
generally accepted the argument that the applicant “As a British national, if he is 
expelled from the land where he is living, he is entitled as of right to come into 
the United Kingdom. This right… is given by international law”.77 Williams states: 
“The proposition that a state can of its own sole authority sever the link which 
binds it to its own nationals in such a way as to be no longer compellable to 
receive back the person denationalized if another state should wish to deport 
him, involves then the consequence that a state has it in its power by 
unilateral action to deprive other states of a right which they now possess in 
relation to particular individuals. It seems contrary to positive international 
law to admit that an international right can be thus destroyed. The duty of a 
state to receive back its nationals is laid down by the accepted authorities in 
the most general terms and is in accordance with the actual practice of 
states”.78 
In a similar vein but from a practical perspective is Anderson who states that there 
is “… something of a mismatch between the popular perception that citizenship 
stripping enables or equates to banishment and the reality… that legal or practical 
reasons will tend to prevent the removal (or make it impossible to resist the 
return) of a single national whose UK citizenship has been taken away”.79  
  
The lawful ability of states to control their borders is founded in state sovereignty. 
This includes, of course, the right of states to control the entry and presence of 
non-nationals to and within their territory. The necessary corollary of this 
universally accepted entitlement is the obligation on states to admit their 
nationals.80 As Hailbronner notes “A state’s duty to respect the sovereignty of 
other states and their sovereign right to decide on the admission of foreigners 
implies a duty to accept a responsibility of a state’s own citizens including an 
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obligation to allow their return”.81 The spectre of extraterritorial deprivation being 
the mechanism whereby the UK could bar a former citizen’s return worried the 
Joint Committee. It said “We would be very concerned if the Government’s main 
or sole purpose in taking this power is to exercise it in relation to naturalised 
British citizens while they are abroad, as it appears that this carries a very great 
risk of breaching the UK’s international obligations to the State who admitted the 
British citizen to its territory”.82 Describing the duty in another way is Fripp who 
states that “The admission of a British citizen to the territory of another state on 
the basis of British nationality, where he or she is not a national of that state and 
so does not have a general right of entrance and residence to it, creates a 
relationship between the two states within which the UK has a duty not to impinge 
upon the sovereignty of the other state by frustrating its ability to expel an alien 
who entered its territory as a British citizen”.83 The underlying point here is that a 
decision to deprive a sole UK national of his citizenship does not affect the UK’s 
international legal obligation to readmit him to its territory. Were the UK to refuse 
to accept the return of such an individual it would be in breach of its obligation to 
the state where the individual is then present.  
 
Power in Breach of Extradite or Prosecute Obligations 
 
Extradite or prosecute obligations within criminally-related treaties to which the 
UK is party form the basis of the final argument in opposition to UK deprivation 
law and practice to be made.84 Relevant treaties include the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997 and the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 2000. In these and 
a number of other conventions are provisions that oblige state parties to ‘take 
appropriate measures’ where the circumstances require.85. Appropriate measures 
include establishing criminal jurisdiction over the acts of one’s nationals wherever 
committed and ensuring an individual’s presence for extradition or prosecution 
where she is within its territory and an investigation satisfied the authorities that 
the circumstances so warrant.86 The deprivation of an individual could prevent or 
affect the UK’s ability to comply with these provisions. This could happen directly 
by deportation subsequent to deprivation, or in a way that defeats the object and 
purpose of the provisions by depriving an individual suspected of applicable crimes 
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whilst abroad. By engaging in deprivations in spite of these obligations Goodwin-
Gill suggests that the UK “… intends to ignore many of its obligations in relation 
to those who may be alleged to have committed, or otherwise been involved in, 
terrorist-related acts, and to seek to off-load them unilaterally”.87 Of course the 
UK’s possible responsibility here turns on several factors, not least of which is the 
nature of the act the individual allegedly committed. To give rise to an extradite 
or prosecute obligation the act must of course fall under an applicable treaty. 
Further, an investigation may well result in the threshold for a UK prosecution not 
being met and there being no request for the individual’s extradition. These factors 
noted, the possibility remains that in certain cases a deprivation decision will 
directly or indirectly frustrate, and so contravene, an extradite or prosecute 
obligation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
UK law and practice governing the deprivation of citizenship arguably conflicts with 
five different rules of public international law tangential or related to it. The 
possible illegality is particularly pronounced where foreign terrorist fighters have 
been affected. This is because they are more likely to be abroad at the point of 
deprivation and/ or to have committed an act falling under an extradite or 
prosecute obligation than others affected by the process. The question of whether 
foreign terrorist fighters are more likely to be naturalised UK citizens and/ or 
amenable to acquiring the nationality of a third state is moot. Regardless, it is 
clear that a considerable proportion of those deprived of their citizenship under 
sections 40(2) and 40(4A) of the BNA 1981ct are foreign terrorist fighters. The 
exercise of power under those sections may conflict with a variety of norms. These 
span the jurisdictional rules within ECtHR jurisprudence to the customary rules 
obliging states to readmit nationals, and from the treaty provisions within the 
1961 Convention and a number of criminally-related treaties to rules attendant to 
ECHR rights. The UK has developed its powers of deprivation in the face of these 
rules – they are not new. Its position is misplaced and antithetical to statelessness 
and international law more generally. Its misconception is illustrated by the belief 
that the 1961 Convention obliged the UK to re-introduce a power to create 
statelessness. Theresa May has stated “… the position the United Kingdom had 
prior to 2003… is the position that we are required to have under the United 
Nations convention”.88 This is clearly not the case. More worryingly, the UK 
Government appears set to make deprivation even easier, promising in 2015 to 
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further “… review rules on citizenship… and how we can more easily revoke 
citizenship from those who reject our values”.89  
 
The UK has a history of working towards the abolition of statelessness and of 
generally adhering to its international legal obligations. In recent years both have 
been tested. It can only be hoped that the country changes course and adheres 
to the international rule of law either of its own initiative or following an adverse 
judgment by an international or national court. This is a priority. As things stand, 
sadly, UK law and practice on deprivation is not too distinct from those “… 
autocrats and dictators who habitually have rendered people stateless”.90 
Tragically, not only is UK law and practice arguably unlawful it is almost certainly 
ineffective in meeting its purported goal of playing a part in addressing the scourge 
of terrorism both within the country and abroad. The words of Voltaire ring true 
today: 
“Not long ago one banished outside the sphere of jurisdiction a petty thief, a 
petty forger, a man guilty of an act of violence. The result was that he became 
a big robber, a forger on a big scale, and murderer within the sphere of 
another jurisdiction. It is as if we threw into our neighbours' fields the stones 
which incommode us in our own”.91  
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